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Three years ago, I taught a course at Luther College titled 
“Vocation as a Call to Citizenship.” This course was to exam-
ine Martin Luther’s thoughts on both vocation and social 
responsibility, to establish a connection with the contempo-
rary debates on citizenship, and to explore some of the ethical 
consequences of such reflection on vocation as a call for global 
awareness. The first challenge to overcome was the expecta-
tion that the class would define each student’s vocation, as 
many thought of vocation simply as their future occupation in 
life. The second challenge was to relate the notion of vocation 
to a broader calling in life, one that both encompasses and 
goes beyond one’s profession. The third challenge was to aid 
students in thinking of themselves as global citizens, that is, 
as people whose local actions have global repercussions and 
vice-versa. The findings of that class created in me a deeper 
awareness that a liberal arts education at a Lutheran college 
has not only the possibility, but the responsibility of preparing 
students for mindful citizenship.
This idea was also affirmed by members of the Religion and 
Philosophy Department who decided to work on a collective 
publication titled “Knowledge as Discernment: Vocation, 
Advocacy, and the Classroom.” This book, which is an ongoing 
project, will offer an epistemological take on vocation, analyz-
ing how the construction of knowledge inside and outside the 
classroom brings together vocation, advocacy, and experience. 
The overarching theme is the notion of vocation as discern-
ment and how knowledge, in the context of a liberal arts 
college affiliated with the ELCA, addresses not only the voca-
tion of teachers (who impart information) or the vocation of 
students (as they prepare for their careers). Rather, this project 
evaluates the epistemological role of vocation proper, as a lens 
through which the learning community (students and teachers 
alike) perceives its role in the world. The project also redefines 
vocation as more than one’s occupation, but rather the founda-
tion of humanity’s call to exist, its capacity to discern and live 
fruitful lives together.
Institutionally, Luther College recently created its Center 
for Ethics and Public Life. As part of the ad hoc committee to 
define the nature and scope of such a center, I have great expecta-
tions for this work. By encouraging deep reflection about ethical 
matters and responsible citizenship, the center will promote 
research, writing, and an ongoing conversation about the public 
choices confronting society and the role ethics ought to play 
in making those choices. Besides bringing notable speakers to 
campus, the center offered an interesting course last spring titled 
“Global Citizenship, Ethics and Public Life: All It Offers is the 
World.” John Moeller, professor of political science and director 
of the Luther Center for Ethics and Public Life, developed the 
course in response to concerns about study abroad reintegra-
tion. Prof. Joy Conrad was the one to teach it. From the course 
description one learns that this was an opportunity for students 
who spent a semester abroad to evaluate their immersion in a 
foreign culture and to reflect on how this experience affected 
their values and influenced their concept of vocation. “We 
talk about major global issues and read about the theoretical 
framework behind problems and solutions,” said Conrad. “It’s 
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when we ask how theories correlate with and affect the country 
in which the student lived—whether developed or developing—
that the conversation gets really interesting.” (Westby)
These three initiatives give you a glimpse of how global 
citizenship is addressed on campus. There are, of course, many 
other activities carried out through teaching, scholarship, and 
service that foster a sense of global citizenship. Although not 
clearly stated in any of the examples, there is both a novel way 
of understanding what citizenship is all about, as well as the 
way a Lutheran theology offers hermeneutical keys to support 
this type of involvement. I would like to explore how Lutheran 
theology, through the Christian notion of neighborly love, 
fosters a sense of responsibility, accountability, and compassion 
toward the world. This, in turn, leads to a notion of citizenship 
that is more than civic engagement or service. Ultimately, to be 
a global citizen is a commitment to transformative participa-
tion in world affairs.
A Lutheran Tenet: Love of Neighbor
A Lutheran reflection on civic responsibility, accountability, and 
commitment toward the wellbeing of others fosters an under-
standing of vocation as a call to citizenship. In his writings, 
Martin Luther spells out that to be a Christian is to live not in 
oneself but with an utmost concern for our neighbor: 
…the good things we have from God should flow from 
one to the other and be common to all, so that everyone 
should ‘put on’ his neighbor and so conduct himself 
toward him as he himself were in the other’s place. 
(“Freedom” 79) 
Indeed, Martin Luther’s ethics could be summarized with his 
statement that Christians live not in themselves, but in Christ 
and in their neighbor. Living in Christ through faith and in their 
neighbor through love, Christians give witness of the Word of 
God. By faith Christians are caught up beyond themselves into 
God. By love they descend beneath themselves into their neighbor. 
(Luther “Freedom” 80) Faith and love act out Jesus’ great com-
mandment, bringing God and neighbor into the ethical living of 
believers: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, 
and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all 
your mind; and your neighbor as yourself.” (Luke 10:27)
Recalling the doctrine of justification by faith, however, 
many believers tend to downplay the importance of good works 
in Luther’s theology. A common misunderstanding is a confu-
sion regarding the role of the law in his theology. Whereas it is 
correct that good works have no place when it comes to the merit 
of salvation, nonetheless good works are an intrinsic part of 
Christian life. The fulfillment of the law in its civic or political 
use is a requirement for all Christians because it guides, compels, 
protects, and leads to good works. (Luther “Commentary”) The 
law, therefore, is not only good and necessary, but it is also God-
given. It is the basis for a just society and serves as a constant 
reminder of our social responsibilities. It locates us in our social 
relationships in family, work, church, country, and as citizens, 
allowing us to spell out who the neighbor Jesus referred to actu-
ally is. Luther summarizes his position in the following way: 
Christians, among themselves and by and for themselves, 
need no law or sword, since it is neither necessary nor 
profitable for them. Since, however, a true Christian lives 
and labors on earth not for himself but for his neighbor, 
therefore the whole spirit of his life impels him to do even 
that which he need not do, but which is profitable and 
necessary for his neighbor. Because the sword is a very 
great benefit and necessary to the whole world, to preserve 
peace, to punish sin and to prevent evil, he submits most 
willingly to the rule of the sword, pays tax, honors those in 
authority, serves, helps, and does all he can to further the 
government, that it may be sustained and held in honor 
and fear. Although he needs none of these things for 
himself and it is not necessary for him to do them, yet he 
considers what is for the good and profit of others, as Paul 
teaches in Ephesians 5:21. (“Secular” 373)
Jesus commands us to love our neighbor as we love our-
selves. As human beings, we have to be constantly reminded of 
this imperative. Depending on us, we would look out only for 
what is good for us, for our family or friends. The egotistical 
and self-centered character of humanity prevents us from fully 
accomplishing the love of neighbor on our own. Either because 
we would use such good works for our own merit or because we 
would reduce the neighbor’s needs to our own interests, good 
works will spring only from justification itself. The use of the 
law in the theological or spiritual sense—when it refers to one’s 
salvation—is condemned. Still, there is a positive and needed 
use for the law also in the theological sense because it reminds 
“...the Christian notion of neighborly 
love fosters a sense of responsibility, 
accountability, and compassion toward 
the world. ”
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humans that we are self-centered creatures, full of pride and 
eager to justify ourselves through our own good deeds. 
According to Luther, faith springs into acts of love. Christians 
will seek the wellbeing of their neighbor not because it is the law, 
but because such good works are committed in freedom, out of 
love. Ultimately, good works are concrete expression of Christian 
service. A Christian vocation includes an active role in political 
affairs, in works of advocacy, and genuine concern for the wellbe-
ing of others not because it brings us closer to God or because we 
achieve merits. Rather, this work is done as a result of our being 
justified. A Christian is free to serve. Ethical reflection, from a 
Lutheran perspective, is the concrete effort to acknowledge the 
right of others as God’s creatures, placing oneself as an instru-
ment of God’s love. The good we do to others is done by God, who 
acts in and through us. Good works stem from a grateful heart, 
through an awareness that we live under God’s grace. By serving 
the other, one’s neighbor, one is also serving Christ.
[The believer] confesses and teaches this gospel to the people 
at the risk of life itself. His whole life and all his effort are 
directed towards the benefit of his neighbor, and this not 
just in order to help him to attain the same grace; but he 
employs his strength, uses his goods, and stakes his reputa-
tion, as he sees Christ did for him and therefore follows His 
example. Christ never gave any other commandment than 
that of love, because He intended that commandment to be 
the test of His disciples and of true believers. For if (good) 
works and love do not blossom forth, it is not genuine faith, 
the gospel has not yet gained a foothold, and Christ is not 
yet rightly known. (“Preface” 18)
Although the core of Luther’s theology on good works is 
quite clear— and its importance undeniable— it is still surpris-
ing how easily this knowledge becomes abstract or its scope 
reduced to charitable actions. The concern for the wellbeing of 
neighbor, as Luther spells out, is the basis for an ethics of care. 
To care for another human being is to assure dignity and life in 
abundance, act for justice and peace, and enable that another 
may flourish as a full human being created in the image of God. 
It implies a genuine concern for the neighbor’s needs. It allows 
another to tell us what they require from us and how we can 
become involved in their life stories. The neighbor is not a mere 
receiver of one’s favor or charity. The neighbor is the other with 
whom I engage as an equal, the one who brings me closer to 
Christ, and the one I am Christ for. 
To serve one’s neighbor—to genuinely care for her or him and 
assure their wellbeing—is to reclaim an ethics of care (cf. Deifelt 
for a more comprehensive account on care from a Lutheran 
perspective). A Christian lives in Christ through faith and in 
his/her neighbor through love. Through faith we relate to God, 
and through love we relate to other human beings. This leads to 
a concern for the wellbeing of others and not exclusively one’s 
own. One cares for the physical and spiritual wellbeing of others 
and fosters relationships that reflect the perception that we are 
God’ creation, redeemed and reconciled in Christ, and called 
forth to announce good news and practice good works.
This is deeply related to Luther’s reflection on vocation. 
Luther affirms that one serves God in whatever station one 
finds oneself. Vocation is how we serve God not in the attempt 
of achieving merits, but for the common good. Vocation is a 
calling in our life situation that permeates every aspect of our 
existence. Thus, his theological findings (for instance, that we 
are justified by faith through grace, that baptized believers are 
to live their faith in community, and— even if good works 
merit no salvation— that there is no Christian life without 
service to the neighbor) are intertwined with the actions in 
concrete, contextual realities. Although Luther’s teachings 
have sometimes been misunderstood as encouraging quiet-
ism or restricting a Christian’s concern to the ecclesial arena, 
they have nonetheless enlightened us on what it means to be 
a Christian and to live out one’s faith in light of that calling, 
vocation. A re-reading of Luther’s theology, with a particular 
focus on the role of believers in society, shows that Christians 
have an important role to play not only in the Church, but also 
in the social realm. Luther’s Two Kingdom theory demon-
strates the creative tension in which Christians live, affirming 
that both Church and State are under the rule of God. To 
acknowledge this is to give Christians a social responsibility,  
a call to live a Christian life in the world.
One could skeptically ask, of course, how feasible this under-
standing of neighborly love in fact is, and to which extent it can 
be applied to citizenship. Martin Luther would be the first to 
admit the paradox of human existence, a reality of already and 
not yet, of simul iustus et peccator (sinner and saint at the same 
time), and the constant need for repentance of wrongs done and 
good left undone. A Christian life is not a life of accomplished 
deeds but one of unfinished struggles. That is why Luther so 
honestly recognizes that, although there are many people who 
are baptized, very few can truly be called Christian. 
“According to Luther, faith springs into 
acts of love.”
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In addition, when relating Luther’s notion of neighborly love  
to the understanding of global citizenship, it is necessary to rec-
ognize that Luther’s views on the political debate are still shaped 
by a medieval mentality, one in which civil liberties and rights are 
not part of the common person’s horizon. The dramatic changes 
engendered by social and political movements (in Europe and 
elsewhere)— including such events as the French Revolution, 
the independence of former colonies, and the plea of women, 
blacks and native populations for the right to vote— forever 
changed power dynamics in society. These changes, albeit posi-
tive, also reflect an Enlightenment anthropology that assumes a 
modern, more individualistic view of the human being, i.e., one 
that is more concerned with individual rights and not necessar-
ily the achievement of a common good. Is Luther’s theology still 
adequate for such a context? What is the role of human agency in 
Luther’s paradoxical approach to Church and Society? How can 
Luther’s theology of vocation prepare us to be better citizens? 
Citizenship
Around the world, there has been a renewed interest in citizen-
ship. Commonly understood, a citizen is a native-born or natural-
ized person who owes allegiance to a particular country and who 
is entitled to its protection. Due to our liberal mindset, we tend 
to associate citizenship with individual rights. When students 
are asked to define citizenship, the first round of the conversation 
focuses precisely on that: how individuals get to exercise their 
rights in particular societies and the right to vote is usually the 
first example offered. The second round of the conversation (and 
most often when specifically asked) includes the responsibilities 
and obligations citizens have to meet in order to be considered 
citizens. Only the third round of the conversation includes the 
wider community— whether one’s advocacy on behalf of particu-
lar social groups, a concern for particular causes, or any collective 
effort for the promotion of the common good. 
Indeed, citizenship can be both the relationships between 
a state and an individual citizen and the political relationship 
between the citizens themselves. To be vested with rights and 
privileges also includes having duties and meeting obligations. 
The actions, opinions, and virtues of citizens allow them to be 
viewed as members of society. Yet, how the individual interacts 
with the collectivity and what rights and responsibilities one has 
in relation to the larger society depends on one’s cultural and 
political views as well as one’s social and historical location. A 
modern understanding of democracy defends that all citizens 
can be full and equal participants in the political process.
It is difficult for us to imagine society without the free and 
equal participation of all in the body politic. If one takes the 
social advancements of women as an example, women’s rights 
are a recent accomplishment at best, and still a longing for most. 
As pointed out by Sylvia Walby, until the twentieth century 
women in the US did not enjoy many features of either civil or 
political citizenship: “They lacked ‘liberty of the persons’ in that 
they did not have the right to control their own bodies in situa-
tions where they wished for abortion or contraception. Married 
women lacked the right to live anywhere other than where their 
husbands insisted.” (167) Married women lacked the right to 
own property and to conclude valid contracts. They did not have 
the right to be free from the physical coercion of husbands nor to 
refuse sexual intercourse. In marriage, husband and wife became 
one, and that one was the husband.
Women’s exclusion from civil, social, political and economic 
citizenship was based on the so-called natural order of cre-
ation. (Bonacchi and Groppi) Since Aristotle’s civic-republican 
thought, it was presumed that political virtues and qualities 
were inherent only to men, who shared natural rights. Because 
women were considered inferior beings, they were excluded 
from such rights and responsibilities. It was presumed that 
nature allocates specific traits to men and women, equipping 
males for the public world and females for childrearing and 
household chores. The classic republican tradition of political 
thought (including thinkers such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, and 
Rousseau) does not envision the participation and representa-
tion of all. The principles of exclusion, usually based on the 
natural order, presume that some are better equipped and have 
more rights than others. Throughout history, similar principles 
were invoked to create “others” who were kept at bay from the 
decision-making processes. This was the basis for keeping slaves, 
indigenous populations, and those who have been colonized as 
legal minors. To be “othered” was to be deemed socially, politi-
cally, or morally inferior. Ironically, the social principles that 
justify the enfranchisement of some continue to support the 
disenfranchisement of others. 
Is the language of rights enough to describe citizenship? As 
Luther pointed out, there is also the component of responsibility 
(the neighbor who requires a response from me). In fact, there is a 
large body of literature dealing with citizen virtues, as exemplified 
by William Galston’s typology. He identifies four categories of 
virtues: 1) General virtues: courage, law-abidingness, loyalty;  
“Is the language of rights enough to 
describe citizenship?”
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2) Social virtues: independence, open-mindedness; 3) Economic 
virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptabil-
ity to economic and technological change; 4) Political virtues: 
capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness 
to demand only what they can pay for, ability to evaluate the 
performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public 
discourse. (221-24) 
In Aristotle’s writings, citizenship is worded in terms of 
obligations and duties: the free propertied male not only had the 
privilege but primarily the obligation to take public office, hence 
sacrificing his private life to do so. Of course, feminist scholar-
ship has long questioned this “altruistic” notion of citizenship by 
pointing out that representation (public office) is a good means to 
establish and perpetuate power relations. Hence, the issue is not 
simply access to vote (which still can defer the responsibility of 
decision-making to others) or to be elected for public office, but to 
which extent one is a participant in the decision-making processes. 
In modern times, citizenship is increasingly identified as rights. 
Liberalism stresses not only the right to participate in public life, 
whether by voting or holding public office. It also includes the 
right to place private commitment ahead of political involvement. 
In other words, we are becoming aware of the increasing number 
of people who see it as their right not to be politically involved.
The language of rights and virtues (or responsibilities) does not 
fully encompass the process of transformation, accountability, and 
agency that citizenship engenders. Rights and obligations do not 
necessarily translate into a care for the res publica, for the common 
good, nor does it show the sentiment of belonging, of being situ-
ated in time and space, and the concern for one’s location. The 
principle of rights and obligations serves us to a great extent, but 
the issues of participation and advocacy cannot be addressed solely 
from this perspective. Here is where religious discourse and care 
might have an additional contribution to offer to the ongoing 
debate on citizenship and the common good. By focusing not 
solely on the rights and duties of citizens vis-à-vis the State, but 
addressing the principles that guide individuals and communities 
to be responsible, there is an epistemological shift. By drawing 
from religious teachings that foment citizenship participation, 
the debate is not restricted to virtues, but includes the responsibil-
ity to advocate for each other. When Luther unfolds the conse-
quences of neighborly love, he establishes that this love is more 
than a virtue one possesses (as moral excellence or goodness) or an 
obligation (as fulfillment of the law). It is a way of life, an ability 
to interact, engage, and genuinely care. It is a responsibility in the 
sense that we respond to God’s call, voiced though the needs of 
our neighbor.
The creative tension between rights and responsibilities 
shows that citizenship refers not only to a legal status, but also to 
a normative ideal. How do we want to live together? Liberalism, 
for instance, gives priority to the individual, stating that there 
is an essential self, a core or essential structure of personhood 
that precedes the social dimension. Because freedom, self-deter-
mination and self-creation are highly valued, this self promotes 
its own perceived interests. A vision of community derives from 
a need for a set of rules to guide social interactions, a “social 
contract” (using Rousseau’s language) that assures liberties and 
individual rights. Liberalism operates under the premises that 
human beings are capacitated for common sense and rational 
reflection (making use of reason). The social interactions regu-
late the public sphere because they concern persons’ roles as citi-
zens, taxpayers, voters, and legal benefit claimants. Liberalism 
defends that the private sphere—the realm of family and 
domestic issues, where religious and moral values are taught and 
cultural traditions passed on— should not be regulated in order 
to assure personal freedoms. This creates an interesting debate 
on the role of religion in liberal societies and the place religious 
organizations occupy in the overall political configuration. (An 
important conversation, in the next years, will be the role of 
faith-based initiatives in the United States.) Feminist theory 
has challenged this dichotomy between public and the private, 
and the border between them is much more nuanced today than 
earlier political theorists had established. Nevertheless, the ques-
tion about the public role of religion is one that will remain with 
us for a while.
Communitarianism, on the other hand, defends that persons 
are deeply determined by their communities, thus rejecting the 
ideal of liberalism’s isolated individual in favor of a community-
centered approach. 
This recognition has led communitarians to assert, using 
the language of constructivism, that we are intimately 
interconnected beings (not originally isolated individuals); 
our personhood emerges out of complex engagements with 
the persons, places, practices, discourses, and traditions 
into which we are born and within which we continue to 
live. (Jones 145) 
This approach defends that it is important to understand 
communities in their own terms and to engage in conversation 
regarding conflicting visions of community.
The definition of a citizen as somebody who inhabits the 
polis, the city, offers an additional insight. A citizen is somebody 
engaged and committed to the welfare of her or his environ-
ment. The awareness of one’s location—the geographical, social, 
economic, cultural and political location we occupy—cannot be 
taken for granted. A few years ago, as a visiting faculty member 
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at Emmanuel College, in Toronto, I was co-teaching a class on 
multicultural education. In one of the sessions, I stressed the 
fact that in order to be a global citizen one needs to be aware 
not only of one’s immediate surroundings, one’s own sense of 
location, but also of what is going on around the globe. Even 
if one can never be truly aware of everything that goes on, a 
concern for contemporary issues facing the globe is vital for our 
sense of belonging. For me, personally, reading a newspaper and 
having access to information is crucial because I grew up under 
a military dictatorship in Brazil. Under censorship, almost no 
information was made available. So, I was utterly surprised 
when a student told me that she did not watch or read any news 
because she could not cope with it. Because the stories were 
always so overwhelming (and I agree, often violent), she just 
switched to another television channel when the news came 
on. In her words, it was a matter of survival. For her own sanity 
and wellbeing, she chose not to learn about the plight of other 
human beings. This, needless to say, gave me pause. I had never 
seen the concept of “survival strategy” applied to an intentional 
withdrawing from the world. 
In the context of a liberal arts education at a Lutheran col-
lege, we might have the impression that students have plenty 
of access to information. Students are often overwhelmed by 
the amount of information. Flooded by data and not knowing 
what to do with it, students are tempted to escape from conflic-
tive issues and retreat into their own virtual space. In fact, the 
withdrawing from the world that my Canadian student named 
as “survival” was a withdrawing into another world, one that 
can be made up virtually by switching channels, where one can 
select outcomes, or create identity. I suspect that many students 
in our classes feel and act the same way. They just don’t voice it as 
clearly. As Castells points out:
 
What we have come to call globalization is not simply a 
process that links together the world but also one that 
differentiates it. It creates new inequalities even as it brings 
into being new commonalities and lines of communica-
tion. And it creates new, up-to-date ways not only of 
connecting places but of bypassing and ignoring them. 
(Ferguson 243) 
The very idea that human beings are social and political beings 
who join together to promote the common good seems flawed. 
People join efforts to promote self-interests, and it takes intention-
ality to negotiate differences, advocate for the rights of others, and 
to willingly engage in sustained debates on how we organize our-
selves as society, how we employ natural resources, how we care for 
the environment, what entails fair wages, or how we educate the 
younger generations. If the goal of citizens is to promote justice in 
a community based on the fulfillment of those who share this just 
arrangement, then the desire for justice needs to be instilled. It is 
not a given reality. A Lutheran contribution to global citizenship 
is to reclaim the role of religion in creating values that inform 
decision-making. It informs us about the needs of the neighbor 
and compels us to think about our role in the world.
Through this calling we serve God’s creative work, we give 
witness of God’s love, and live according to Jesus Christ’s teach-
ings. This belief, therefore, calls for a broadening of the concept 
of citizenship in order not to focus solely on individual rights 
and duties, but also on the ethical dimension of promoting 
the values of public responsibility, accountability, and life in 
abundance for all. If citizenship is not reduced to representation, 
but includes participation in the social and cultural fabric, then 
the notion of citizenship can be informed by religious values. As 
part of civil society, the church (independent of denomination) 
can educate for transformative participation. In doing so, it will 
answer its call to be a witness to the world at large.
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